Editorial
Afghanistan
The War That Lost Its Center
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Urstan Pass, Nuristan, Afghanistan — May 2007
A soldier named Nehmat prays during guard duty at Gowardesh Outpost, an Afghan National Army position held by Weapons Company, 2nd Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201 Corps, three miles from the Pakistani border in Nuristan. His rifle and boots rest beside him on the rock as the valley falls into shadow, a brief moment of stillness in a sector where ambushes and cross-border infiltration shaped the daily rhythm of the Afghanistan War 2001. Gowardesh Outpost sits three miles from the Pakistani border in Nuristan, one of the principal infiltration corridors used during the Afghanistan insurgency 2001–2008. The unit, drawn from every major tribal group in the country, embodied the experiment of building a national army in a war that was already moving beyond its original objective.
The early hours of October 7, 2001 began with a succession of airstrikes over Kabul and other strategic locations across Afghanistan. Cruise missiles launched from naval vessels in the Arabian Sea, combined with long-range bombers, struck Taliban command structures, air defense systems, and training camps associated with Al Qaeda. Operation Enduring Freedom entered its visible phase, marking the beginning of the Afghanistan War 2001. The objective was defined with clarity: dismantle terrorist networks and remove the Taliban regime that had provided them sanctuary.
In the weeks that followed, the operational tempo advanced rapidly. U.S. Special Forces units were inserted into northern Afghanistan, where they coordinated closely with Northern Alliance militias that had been resisting Taliban control. Precision airstrikes directed from the ground allowed these local forces to advance across key territories. By November 13, Kabul had fallen. Kandahar, the symbolic center of Taliban authority, was abandoned shortly thereafter. The collapse of the regime unfolded with a speed that suggested a decisive military success.
On December 22, 2001, Hamid Karzai assumed leadership of an interim administration under the framework established in Bonn. The political architecture of a new Afghan state began to take form. International forces were deployed to support stability, initially focused on Kabul and its immediate surroundings. The expectation was that the combination of military victory and political transition would allow for a gradual normalization of the country.
Urstan Pass, Nuristan, Afghanistan — May 2007
An Afghan National Army gunner from Weapons Company, 2nd Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201 Corps returns fire after a suspected ambush near the Urstan Pass, one of the most heavily used Taliban transit routes between Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan. The blurred frame, captured at the moment of contact, condenses the fragmented and adaptive nature of the Afghanistan insurgency 2001–2008, where engagements rarely had a visible front. Gowardesh Outpost sits three miles from the Pakistani border in Nuristan, one of the principal infiltration corridors used during the Afghanistan insurgency 2001–2008. The unit, drawn from every major tribal group in the country, embodied the experiment of building a national army in a war that was already moving beyond its original objective.
Gowardesh Outpost, Nuristan, Afghanistan — May 2007
Soldiers from the Afghan National Army's Weapons Company, 2nd Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201 Corps share tea and a cigarette at Gowardesh Outpost, three miles from the Pakistani border in Nuristan. Behind them, HESCO walls and improvised wooden structures mark the limit of a position that was permanently exposed to mortar fire and infiltration during the long war dynamics of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. Gowardesh Outpost sits three miles from the Pakistani border in Nuristan, one of the principal infiltration corridors used during the Afghanistan insurgency 2001–2008. The unit, drawn from every major tribal group in the country, embodied the experiment of building a national army in a war that was already moving beyond its original objective.
Gowardesh Outpost, Nuristan, Afghanistan — May 2007
Soldiers from Weapons Company, 2nd Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201 Corps relax on the rooftop of Gowardesh Outpost as the Hindu Kush turns blue behind them. The scene, almost domestic in its quiet camaraderie, takes place inside one of the most exposed Afghan National Army positions facing the Pakistani border, a place where the rhetoric of nation-building and the reality of occupation and fragmentation existed within the same square metre. Gowardesh Outpost sits three miles from the Pakistani border in Nuristan, one of the principal infiltration corridors used during the Afghanistan insurgency 2001–2008. The unit, drawn from every major tribal group in the country, embodied the experiment of building a national army in a war that was already moving beyond its original objective.
Yet beyond the capital, control remained fragmented. Taliban fighters had not been eliminated. They had dispersed. Many withdrew into rural regions, others crossed into Pakistan, and some blended into local populations. The absence of a centralized enemy structure complicated the nature of the conflict. What had begun as a targeted military campaign started to evolve into a broader and less defined engagement, a war beyond its objective.
By 2002, operations expanded into eastern Afghanistan, particularly in mountainous regions such as Tora Bora. These missions aimed to locate and neutralize remaining Al Qaeda elements. The terrain presented immediate challenges. Steep valleys, isolated villages, and an extensive border with Pakistan allowed for movement that was difficult to monitor. Fighters could retreat, regroup, and re-enter the conflict with relative ease.
Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
A handler restrains his fighting dog as a second animal is pulled away on the outskirts of Kabul. Friday dog fights — held after midday prayers — remain one of the few mass leisure events in a city with little public entertainment, drawing thousands of spectators and bets that can reach several thousand dollars. The same gatherings have also become targets: in 2008, a suicide bombing at a dog fight in Kandahar killed 67 people. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
Children play and work in the ruins of a Kabul neighbourhood, one of many districts of the capital that never recovered from the civil war of the 1990s. For an entire generation of Afghan minors, the streets are simultaneously workplace, playground and battlefield, and child labour has become one of the most visible mechanisms of household survival under the prolonged Afghanistan War 2001. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
A woman wearing a burqa and a small girl warm themselves by a bonfire in the middle of a flooded road on the outskirts of Kabul. More than 3.5 million Afghan refugees returned from Iran and Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, only to find a country in ruins, with no housing, no work and no functioning institutions to absorb them. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
At the same time, the international presence began to widen. The International Security Assistance Force extended its mandate, gradually moving beyond Kabul. Reconstruction efforts were initiated alongside military operations. Roads were repaired, institutions rebuilt, and aid programs introduced. However, these initiatives were uneven in their impact. In many areas, local power structures remained dominant, limiting the reach of central governance.
The insurgency began to re-emerge gradually. By 2003, attacks against coalition forces increased in frequency. Ambushes, small-arms fire, and improvised explosive devices started to define the operational environment. Unlike the initial phase of the war, the conflict no longer revolved around identifiable targets. It became dispersed, adaptive, and persistent, shaping the Afghanistan insurgency 2001–2008.
Russian Cultural Centre, Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
Inside the gutted shell of the former Soviet Cultural Centre in Kabul, two men prepare heroin by the light of a plastic-covered window. Up to 1,700 addicts pass through the building every day, injecting and smoking among the rubble in what functions as the largest open-air shooting gallery in the city. A gram of heroin sells for around 50 Afghanis (one US dollar) and severe addicts consume up to five grams a day, sustaining the habit through begging and petty theft. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Russian Cultural Centre, Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
Two men sit against a wall scratched with graffiti inside the ruins of the former Soviet Cultural Centre in Kabul. Afghanistan has more than one million drug addicts, the majority of whom developed their dependency in exile in Iran or Pakistan and brought it back home after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The country produces around 90 percent of the world's opium, but it is its own population that absorbs the most invisible cost of the trade. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
A group of users gather among the mud walls of an abandoned compound on the outskirts of Kabul, one of the dozens of informal shooting galleries that operate across the capital. The expansion of heroin consumption inside Afghanistan during the years of international intervention is one of the clearest expressions of the war beyond its objective: a domestic public-health emergency growing in parallel with a counter-narcotics policy that has failed at every level. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Southern Afghanistan, particularly the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, became focal points of this transformation. These regions had longstanding connections to Taliban networks. Recruitment, logistics, and local support enabled insurgent groups to re-establish their presence. Coalition forces, including British, Canadian, and Dutch units, deployed in greater numbers to these areas. The mission shifted from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency.
The distinction between combatant and civilian blurred. Insurgents operated within communities, using the terrain and social structures to their advantage. Coalition forces faced the challenge of engaging hostile elements while maintaining the support of local populations. Civilian casualties, whether resulting from airstrikes or ground operations, became a recurring issue with strategic consequences.
Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
A boy pauses with his bicycle in front of bombed-out buildings on the edge of Kabul, with the snow-covered Hindu Kush in the distance. The destroyed apartment block on the left, the gutted bus, the empty wasteland where a neighbourhood used to stand: each element of the frame condenses the layered destruction of three successive wars, from the Soviet occupation to the Taliban era and the Afghanistan War 2001. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
In 2004, Afghanistan held its first presidential election. The event was presented as a milestone in the reconstruction process. Karzai was elected, and the formation of national institutions continued. However, these political developments did not translate into stability across the country. In many rural regions, the presence of the central government remained limited.
Improvised explosive devices became increasingly prevalent. Though initially less sophisticated than those used in other conflict zones, their effectiveness grew. Convoys, patrols, and checkpoints became targets. The unpredictability of these attacks created a constant sense of vulnerability among deployed forces.
Old market, Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
Cages of turkeys and chickens stacked in the old market of Kabul, one of the few areas of the city where pre-war commercial life still survives. Despite the constant threat of suicide attacks against public spaces, traditional bazaars remain the economic spine of the capital, sustaining tens of thousands of families through informal trade in a country where formal employment is largely inaccessible. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Old market, Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
A group of men share a small mud-walled room above the old market of Kabul, where merchants, day labourers and recently returned refugees often live and work in the same space. The intimate domestic geography of the bazaar — narrow rooms, communal sleeping mats, walls marked with prayer-counts and phone numbers — contrasts with the official narrative of reconstruction promoted from the international compounds across the river. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Institute for Malaria and Leishmaniasis, Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
With temperatures well below freezing, a woman peers through the steamed-up window of the waiting room at the Institute for Malaria and Leishmaniasis in Kabul. The clinic receives around 50 new patients and 200 returning patients each day. Leishmaniasis, transmitted by sandflies that breed easily in the cracks of the city's collapsing housing, produces severe skin ulcers and, in its visceral form, can be fatal. The standard six-week treatment costs around 150 dollars, an unreachable sum for most Afghan families, and stocks of the medication run out repeatedly. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
By 2005, the conflict had entered a new phase. Parliamentary elections were held, further consolidating the formal structure of governance. At the same time, insurgent activity intensified. Coordinated attacks across multiple provinces indicated a level of organization that challenged earlier assumptions about the strength of opposition forces.
Helmand province emerged as a central theater. British forces, deployed as part of NATO's mission, encountered resistance that quickly escalated. Forward positions were established in remote districts, often isolated and difficult to reinforce. What had been conceived as a stabilization effort became sustained combat.
The operational environment evolved into a war of attrition. Coalition forces conducted patrols, raids, and defensive operations on a daily basis. Insurgent groups avoided direct confrontation, focusing instead on sustained pressure. Targeted assassinations of local officials and community leaders undermined governance efforts.
Institute for Malaria and Leishmaniasis, Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
Afghan women and children queue inside the Institute for Malaria and Leishmaniasis in Kabul, the only specialised public clinic in the city for these diseases. Most patients arrive on foot from the informal settlements that ring the capital, where overcrowding, untreated wastewater and damaged housing create ideal conditions for vector-borne illnesses. The waiting room becomes one of the few neutral civic spaces left in Kabul. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Institute for Malaria and Leishmaniasis, Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
A female doctor at the Institute for Malaria and Leishmaniasis in Kabul examines a young patient's face, looking for the characteristic ulcers of cutaneous leishmaniasis. The presence of women working as physicians in the public health system, almost erased during the Taliban years, became one of the most concrete — and most fragile — gains of the post-2001 reconstruction. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
ICRC Orthopaedic Centre, Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
An amputee trains between parallel bars at the International Committee of the Red Cross orthopaedic centre in Kabul, while an elderly patient waits beside a wheelchair. The ICRC has been working in Afghanistan since 1989 with the victims of three decades of war, treating 34,000 amputees and 54,000 patients affected by other disabling conditions such as polio. Its workshops produce 600 prosthetic legs, 1,200 sets of crutches and 100 wheelchairs every month, in one of the most heavily mined countries on earth. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
By 2006, violence had increased significantly. NATO assumed broader operational control across Afghanistan. Large-scale operations were conducted to clear insurgent-held areas. These efforts achieved temporary success but failed to produce lasting control. Once forces withdrew, insurgents returned.
The absence of a clear front line defined the conflict. Engagements could occur at any moment. Intelligence gathering depended heavily on local sources, whose reliability varied. Cultural and linguistic barriers added complexity to every operation. Air power remained a critical component of military strategy. Close air support allowed ground units to respond to threats quickly. However, the use of airstrikes carried risks. Civilian casualties generated local resentment and influenced broader perceptions of the conflict.
Within the United States and allied countries, the war began to generate sustained debate. Questions emerged regarding objectives, timelines, and costs. What had been framed as a necessary response to terrorism was becoming a prolonged commitment with uncertain outcomes. The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan played a central role. Insurgent groups used border regions as safe havens. This dynamic complicated efforts to achieve stability within Afghanistan itself. Political sensitivities limited direct action in these regions.
Kabul Psychiatric Hospital, Afghanistan — February 2009
Saigedullah, a heroin addict, sits wrapped in a blanket inside Kabul's psychiatric hospital. The capital has only one detoxification unit with a capacity of four beds. Patients spend ten days inside before being released onto the same streets and the same dealers, completing a cycle that the public system has neither the resources nor the staff to interrupt. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
Kabul Psychiatric Hospital, Afghanistan — January 2009
Patients inside the male ward of Kabul's psychiatric hospital. Three decades of consecutive wars — Soviet occupation, civil war, Taliban rule and the post-2001 conflict — have left a trail of post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and untreated psychosis that the country's barely existing mental-health system is unable to address. The ward, with its bare walls and metal beds, functions more as a place of containment than of treatment. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
By 2007, coalition forces increased their presence in key areas. Operations intensified, targeting insurgent networks. Yet the overall pattern remained unchanged. Tactical gains did not translate into strategic resolution. The insurgency transformation continued. The daily experience of soldiers reflected this reality. Patrols through villages, engagement with local communities, and the constant threat of explosive devices defined the rhythm of deployment. The psychological impact of repeated exposure accumulated over time.
Efforts to build Afghan security forces expanded. Training programs aimed to establish an army and police capable of maintaining order. Progress was uneven. Issues of capability, loyalty, and infiltration persisted. The effectiveness of these forces varied across regions. Reconstruction efforts continued alongside military operations. Infrastructure projects, economic initiatives, and development programs were implemented. However, corruption and logistical challenges limited their effectiveness. In some cases, these efforts failed to gain local trust.
Kabul, Afghanistan — February 2009
A woman in a burqa raises her hand against the window of a stationary car in Kabul, asking for money. In a society that systematically restricts women's access to work, widows and abandoned wives are often left with no economic option other than begging. The image — a body covered, a hand exposed, a glass between two worlds — became one of the most repeated visual figures of the prolonged Afghanistan War 2001 and of its long war dynamics. By February 2009, Afghanistan had become the central theatre of the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. After years of strategic focus on Iraq, Washington was rediscovering a country exhausted by three decades of war, broken promises and daily struggle for survival, where civilians had largely lost faith in the Western project and concentrated on the immediate task of getting through the day.
By the end of the first seven years, the conflict had transformed fundamentally. The initial objective of dismantling terrorist networks had expanded into a broader effort to stabilize an entire country. The gap between these objectives and the realities on the ground defined the nature of the war. The insurgency had not been defeated. It had adapted and endured. Coalition forces remained engaged in continuous operations, while political structures struggled to assert authority beyond major urban centers.
The war existed on multiple levels simultaneously. It was a military campaign, a state-building effort, and a geopolitical struggle. Each dimension influenced the others, creating a complexity that resisted simple resolution. The early perception of a rapid victory had given way to a prolonged engagement without a clear endpoint. The war had lost its initial center and expanded into something more diffuse and difficult to define. Years later, this dynamic would lead to a reassessment of the entire mission. In April 2021, the United States announced the decision to withdraw all remaining troops from Afghanistan, ending the US war in Afghanistan Taliban conflict. The process, completed in August of that year, marked the end of two decades of military presence and closed a conflict that had begun with clarity of purpose and evolved into a prolonged and unresolved war.
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Afghanistan is part of the long-term work of Álvaro Ybarra Zavala, within Editorial. See the full record of publications, exhibitions and awards in the news archive.